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Abstract 
We investigate the performance of two machine learning algorithms in the context of anti-
spam filtering. The increasing volume of unsolicited bulk e-mail (spam) has generated a need 
for reliable anti-spam filters. Filters of this type have so far been based mostly on keyword 
patterns that are constructed by hand and perform poorly. The Naive Bayesian classifier has 
recently been suggested as an effective method to construct automatically anti-spam filters 
with superior performance. We investigate thoroughly the performance of the Naive Bayesian 
filter on a publicly available corpus, contributing towards standard benchmarks. At the same 
time, we compare the performance of the Naive Bayesian filter to an alternative memory-
based learning approach, after introducing suitable cost-sensitive evaluation measures. Both 
methods achieve very accurate spam filtering, outperforming clearly the keyword-based filter 
of a widely used e-mail reader.  
1. Introduction 
Electronic mail is an efficient and increasingly popular communication medium. Like every 
powerful medium, however, it is prone to misuse. One such case of misuse is the blind 
posting of unsolicited e-mail messages, also known as spam, to very large numbers of 
recipients. Spam messages are typically sent using bulk-mailers and address lists harvested 
from web pages and newsgroup archives. They vary significantly in content, from vacation 
advertisements to get-rich schemes. The common feature of these messages is that they are 
usually of little interest to the majority of the recipients. In some cases, they may even be 
harmful, e.g. spam messages advertising pornographic sites may be read by children. Apart 
from wasting time and bandwidth, spam e-mail also costs money to users with dial-up 
connections. A 1997 study (Cranor & Lamacchia 1998) reported that spam messages 
constituted approximately 10% of the incoming messages to a corporate network. The 
situation seems to be worsening, and without appropriate counter-measures, spam messages 
could eventually undermine the usability of e-mail. 
                                                 
1 Proceedings of the workshop “Machine Learning and Textual Information Access”, H. Zaragoza, P. Gallinari, 
and M. Rajman (Eds.), 4th European Conference on Principles and Practice of Knowledge Discovery in 
Databases (PKDD-2000), Lyon, France, September 2000, pp.1-13.  
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Attempts to introduce legal measures against spam mailing have had limited effect.2 A 
more effective solution is to develop tools to help recipients identify or remove automatically 
spam messages. Such tools, called anti-spam filters, vary in functionality from blacklists of 
frequent spammers to content-based filters. The latter are generally more powerful, as 
spammers often use fake addresses. Existing content-based filters search for particular 
keyword patterns in the messages. These patterns need to be crafted by hand, and to achieve 
better results they need to be tuned to each user and to be constantly maintained (Cranor & 
Lamacchia 1998), a tedious task, requiring expertise that a user may not have. 
We address the issue of anti-spam filtering with the aid of machine learning. We examine 
supervised learning methods, which learn to identify spam e-mail after receiving training on 
messages that have been manually classified as spam or non-spam (hereafter legitimate). 
Learning algorithms of this type have been applied to several text categorization tasks (e.g. 
Apte & Damerau 1994, Lewis 1996, Dagan et al. 1997), including classifying e-mail into 
folders (Cohen 1996, Payne & Edwards 1997), or identifying interesting news articles  (Lang 
1995; see also Spertus 1997). Recently, Sahami et al. (1998) trained a Naive Bayesian 
classifier (Duda & Hart 1973, Mitchell 1997) for anti-spam filtering, reporting impressive 
performance on unseen messages. To our knowledge, this is the only previous attempt to 
apply machine learning to anti-spam filtering. 
We have constructed a new benchmark corpus, which is a mixture of spam messages and 
messages sent via a moderated (and, hence, spam-free) mailing list. The corpus is made 
publicly available for other researchers to use as a benchmark.3 Using this corpus, we 
performed a thorough evaluation of the Naive Bayesian algorithm, used in (Sahami et al. 
1998), after introducing new cost-sensitive evaluation metrics. These are necessary to get an 
objective picture of the performance of the algorithm, when the cost of misclassification 
differs for the two classes (spam and legitimate). Furthermore, we used 10-fold cross-
validation to get a more unbiased performance estimate, and investigated the effect of 
attribute-set size, an issue that had not been examined in (Sahami et al. 1998). 
Another important contribution of the work presented here is the comparison of the Naive 
Bayesian classifier with another learning method, namely the memory-based classifier of 
TiMBL (Daelemans et al. 1999). We chose a memory-based classifier on the grounds that 
spam messages cover a very broad range of topics. This suggests that memory-based 
algorithms, that attempt to classify messages by finding similar previously received messages, 
may perform equally well as algorithms that attempt to learn unifying characteristics of spam 
messages. Our results confirmed this suspicion, and TiMBL achieved high classification 
accuracy. On average, the two learning methods performed equally well, with the best method 
depending on the exact usage scenario of the filter. Both methods outperformed clearly the 
keyword-based filter of Outlook 2000, a widely used e-mail reader.4 5 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes our benchmark 
corpus; section 3 discusses preprocessing steps that are needed before applying the learning 
algorithms; section 4 presents the learning algorithms that we used; section 5 introduces cost-
sensitive evaluation measures; section 6 discusses our experimental results; and section 7 
concludes. 
                                                 
2 Consult http://www.cauce.org, http://spam.abuse.net, and http://www.junkemail.org . 
3 The corpus is available from the publications section of http://www.iit.demokritos.gr/~ionandr . 
4 “Outlook 2000” is a trademark of Microsoft Corporation. Outlook’s documentation points to a file containing 
the patterns of its anti-spam filter. We tried both a case-sensitive and a case-insensitive version of these patterns, 
and use the best-performing version in each experiment. 
5 An earlier summary of our experiments with the Naive Bayesian classifier, not comprising the experiments 
with TiMBL and Outlook 2000, can be found in (Androutsopoulos et al. 2000a).  
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2. Corpus collection  
The benchmark corpus that we constructed is a mixture of spam messages and messages 
received via the Linguist list, a moderated mailing list about the profession and science of 
linguistics.6 The corpus, dubbed Ling-Spam, consists of 2893 messages: 
• 2412 Linguist messages, obtained by randomly downloading digests from the list’s 
archives, breaking the digests into their messages, and removing text added by the list’s 
server.  
• 481 spam messages, received by the first author. Attachments, HTML tags, and duplicate 
spam messages received on the same day were not included.  
Spam messages are 16.6% of the corpus, a figure close to the incoming spam rates of the 
authors, and rates reported in (Sahami et al. 1998) and (Cranor & LaMacchia 1998).  
Although the Linguist messages are more topic-specific than most users’ incoming e-
mail, they are less standardized than one might expect (e.g. they contain job postings, 
software availability announcements, even flame-like responses). Hence, useful preliminary 
conclusions about anti-spam filtering can be reached with Ling-Spam, until better public 
corpora become available.7 With a more direct interpretation, our experiments can also be 
seen as a study on anti-spam filters for open un-moderated mailing lists or newsgroups. 
3. Corpus preprocessing 
For every message in Ling-Spam, a vector representation nxxxxx ,,,, 321 =  was 
computed, where nxx ,,1   are the values of attributes nXX ,,1  , much as in the vector 
space model (Salton & McGill 1983). Following (Sahami et al. 1998), all attributes are 
binary: 1=iX  if some characteristic represented by iX  is present in the message; otherwise 
0=iX . In our experiments, attributes correspond to words, i.e. each attribute shows if a 
particular word (e.g. “adult”) occurs in the message. It is also possible, however, to introduce 
attributes corresponding to phrases (e.g. showing if “be over 21” is present) or non-textual 
properties (e.g. whether or not a message contains attachments; see Sahami et al. 1998).  
As in (Sahami et al. 1998), to select among all possible attributes (in our case, all possible 
word-attributes), we compute the mutual information ( MI ) of each candidate attribute X  
with the category-denoting variable C : 
)()(
),(log),();(
},{},1,0{ cCPxXP
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legitspamcx =⋅=
==
⋅=== ∑
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The attributes with the m  highest MI -scores are then selected. The probabilities are 
estimated from the training corpus as frequency ratios.8 To avoid treating forms of the same 
word as different attributes, a lemmatizer was applied to Ling-Spam, substituting each word 
by its base form (e.g. “earning” becomes “earn”).9 
                                                 
6 The Linguist list is archived at http://listserv.linguistlist.org/archives/linguist.html . 
7 To address privacy issues, we have recently started experimenting with suitably “encoded” personal e-mail 
folders. Consult (Androutsopoulos et al. 2000b). 
8 Consult (Mitchell 1996) for more elaborate estimates. 
9 We used morph, a lemmatizer included in GATE. See http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/research/groups/nlp/gate . 
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4. Classification of e-mail messages  
We now turn to the learning algorithms we experimented with. 
4.1. Naive Bayesian classification 
From Bayes’ theorem and the theorem of total probability, the probability that a document 
d  with vector nxxx ,,1 l=  belongs to category c  is: 
∑
∈
==⋅=
==⋅=
===
},{
)|()(
)|()()|(
legitspamk
kCxXPkCP
cCxXPcCPxXcCP  
In practice, the probabilities )|( CXP  are impossible to estimate without simplifying 
assumptions, because the possible values of X  are too many and there are also data 
sparseness problems. The Naive Bayesian classifier assumes that nXX ,,1 l  are conditionally 
independent given the category C , which yields: 
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)|( CXP i  and )(CP  are easy to estimate from the frequencies of the training corpus. A large 
number of empirical studies have found the Naive Bayesian classifier to be surprisingly 
effective (Langley et al. 1992, Domingos & Pazzani 1996), despite the fact that the 
assumption that the independence assumption is usually overly simplistic.10  
Mistakenly blocking a legitimate message (classifying a legitimate message as spam) is 
generally more severe an error than letting a spam message pass the filter (classifying a spam 
message as legitimate). Let spamlegit→  and legitspam→  denote the two error types. 
Invoking a decision-theoretic notion of cost, we assume that spamlegit→  is λ  times more 
costly than legitspam→ . A message is classified as spam if the following criterion is met: 
λ>
==
==
)|(
)|(
xXlegitimateCP
xXspamCP  
To the extent that the independence assumption holds and the probability estimates are 
accurate, a classifier based on this criterion achieves optimal results (Duda & Hart 1973). In 
our case, )|(1)|( xXlegitimateCPxXspamCP ==−=== , and the classification criterion 
is equivalent to: 
txXspamCP >== )|( , with 
λ
λ
+
=
1
t , 
t
t
−
=
1
λ  
In the experiments of (Sahami et al. 1998), t  was set to 0.999, which corresponds to 
999=λ . That is, mistakenly blocking a legitimate message was taken to be as bad as letting 
999 spam messages pass the filter. When blocked messages are discarded without further 
                                                 
10 Consult (Friedman et al. 1997) for Bayesian classifiers with less restrictive independence assumptions.  
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processing, setting λ  to such a high value is reasonable, because in that case most users 
would consider losing a legitimate message unacceptable. Alternative usage scenarios are 
possible, however, and lower λ  values are reasonable in those cases.  
For example, rather than being deleted, a blocked message could be returned to the 
sender, with an automatically inserted apology paragraph. The extra paragraph would explain 
that a filter blocked the message, and it would ask the sender to repost the message to a 
different, private un-filtered e-mail address of the recipient (see also Hall 1998). The private 
address would never be advertised (e.g. on web pages or newsgroups), making it unlikely to 
receive spam mail directly. Furthermore, the apology paragraph could include a frequently 
changing riddle (e.g. “Include in the subject the capital of France.”) to ensure that spam 
messages are not forwarded automatically to the private address by robots that scan returned 
messages for new e-mail addresses. Messages sent to the private address without the correct 
riddle answer would be deleted automatically. (Spammers cannot afford the time to answer 
thousands of riddles.)  
In the scenario of the previous paragraph, 9=λ  ( 9.0=t ) seems more reasonable: 
blocking a legitimate message is penalized mildly more than letting a spam message pass, to 
account for the fact that recovering from a blocked legitimate message requires overall more 
work (counting the sender’s extra work to repost it) than recovering from a spam message that 
passed the filter (deleting it manually).  
A third scenario would be to assume that the anti-spam filter simply flags messages it 
considers to be spam, without removing them from the user’s mailbox (e.g. to help the user 
prioritize the reading of the messages). In that case, 1=λ  ( 5.0=t ) seems reasonable, since 
none of the two error types is significantly graver than the other.  
4.2. Memory-based classification 
The second method that we evaluated belongs to the family of memory-based (or instance-
based) methods (Mitchell, 1997). The common feature of these methods is that they store all 
training instances in a memory structure, and use them directly for classification. The simplest 
form of memory structure is the multi-dimensional space defined by the attributes in the 
instance vectors. Each training instance is represented as a point in that space. The 
classification procedure is usually a variant of the simple k-nearest-neighbor (k-nn) algorithm. 
k-nn assigns to each new unseen instance the majority class among the k training instances 
that are closest to the unseen instance (its k-neighborhood).     
We used the memory-based classification algorithm implemented in the TiMBL software 
(Daelemans et al., 1999). TiMBL provides a basic memory-based classification algorithm and 
extensions to address issues such as efficient computation of the k-neighborhood and attribute 
weighting. We only used the basic algorithm, which is a variant of k-nn. One important 
difference from k-nn is in the definition of the k-neighborhood. TiMBL considers all the 
training instances at the k closest distances from the unseen instance. If there are more than 
one neighbors at each distance, the algorithm examines many more than k neighbors. In such 
cases, a small value of k is necessary, to avoid considering instances that are very different 
from the unseen one. A further addition we made to the basic TiMBL algorithm is a post-
processing stage to take λ into account. This simply multiplies the number of legitimate 
neighbors by λ, before deciding on the majority class in the neighborhood. 
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5. Measures to evaluate classification performance 
In classification tasks, performance is often measured in terms of accuracy ( Acc ) or error 
rate ( AccErr −= 1 ). Let legitN  and spamN  be the total numbers of legitimate and spam 
messages, respectively, to be classified by the filter, and ZYn →  the number of messages 
belonging to category Y  that the filter classified as belonging to category Z  
( },{, spamlegitZY ∈ ). Then: 
spamlegit
spamspamlegitlegit
NN
nn
Acc
+
+
=
→→         
spamlegit
legitspamspamlegit
NN
nn
Err
+
+
=
→→  
Accuracy and error rate assign equal weights to the two error types ( spamlegit→  and 
legitspam→ ). However, spamlegit→  is λ  times more costly than legitspam→ . To 
make accuracy and error rate sensitive to this cost difference, each legitimate message is 
treated, for evaluation purposes, as if it were λ  messages. That is, when a legitimate message 
is blocked, this counts as λ  errors; and when it passes the filter, this counts as λ  successes. 
This leads to the following definitions of weighted accuracy (WAcc ) and weighted error rate 
( WAccWErr −= 1 ): 
spamlegit
spamspamlegitlegit
NN
nn
WAcc
+⋅
+⋅
=
→→
λ
λ
         
spamlegit
legitspamspamlegit
NN
nn
WErr
+⋅
+⋅
=
→→
λ
λ
 
The values of accuracy and error rate (or their weighted versions) are often misleadingly 
high. To get a clear picture of a classifier’s performance, it is common to compare its 
accuracy or error rate to those of a simplistic “baseline” approach. We use the case where no 
filter is present as our baseline: legitimate messages are (correctly) never blocked, and spam 
messages (mistakenly) always pass. The weighted accuracy and weighted error rate of the 
baseline are: 
spamlegit
legitb
NN
N
WAcc
+⋅
⋅
=
λ
λ
         
spamlegit
spamb
NN
N
WErr
+⋅
=
λ
 
The total cost ratio (TCR ) allows the performance of a filter to be compared easily to 
that of the baseline: 
legitspamspamlegit
spam
b
nn
N
WErr
WErrTCR
→→
+⋅
==
λ
 
Greater TCR  values indicate better performance. For 1<TCR , the baseline (not using the 
filter) is better. If cost is proportional to wasted time, an intuitive meaning for TCR  is the 
following: it measures how much time is wasted to delete manually all spam messages when 
no filter is used ( spamN ), compared to the time wasted to delete manually any spam messages 
that passed the filter ( legitspamn → ) plus the time needed to recover from mistakenly blocked 
legitimate messages ( spamlegitn →⋅λ ). 
For the benefit of readers more familiar with information retrieval and extraction tasks, 
our experimental results are also presented in terms of spam recall ( SR ) and spam precision 
( SP ): 
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spam
spamspam
N
n
SR →=          
spamlegitspamspam
spamspam
nn
n
SP
→→
→
+
=  
Spam recall measures the percentage of spam messages that the filter manages to block 
(intuitively its effectiveness), while spam precision measures the degree to which the blocked 
messages are indeed spam (the filter’s safety). Despite their intuitiveness, it is difficult to 
compare the performance of different filters using spam recall and precision: each filter (or 
filter configuration) yields a pair of spam recall and precision results; without a single 
unifying measure, like TCR  that incorporates the cost difference between the two error types, 
it is difficult to decide which pair is better.11 
6. Experimental results 
We performed three sets of experiments on Ling-Spam, corresponding to the three scenarios 
(parameter λ) that were described in section 4.1. In each scenario, we varied the number of 
selected attributes from 50 to 700 by 50, each time retaining the attributes with the highest MI 
scores. 10-fold cross-validation was used in all experiments: Ling-Spam was partitioned 
randomly into ten parts, and the experiment was repeated ten times, each time reserving a 
different part for testing, and using the remaining nine parts for training. WAcc  was then 
averaged over the ten iterations, and TCR  was computed as bWErr  divided by the average 
WErr . The figures below show the average performance of each method in each experiment, 
including the TCR  scores we obtained with Outlook’s patterns. At the end of this section we 
                                                 
11 The F-measure, used in information retrieval and extraction to combine recall and precision (e.g. Riloff & 
Lehnert 1994), cannot be used here, because its weighting factor cannot be related to the cost difference of the 
two error types. 
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select the best-performing configuration for each filter and scenario, and perform tests to 
establish statistically significant differences. 
6.1. Scenario 1: Flagging spam messages (λ=1) 
In this scenario, the misclassification cost is identical for both error types. Figure 1 shows the 
corresponding results. The most important finding here is that both learning methods achieve 
very accurate classification, improving significantly on the baseline. Both methods perform 
better with small numbers of attributes. Their performance deteriorates as the size of the 
attribute set increases, which is due to the known sensitivity of the methods to data 
sparseness, caused by increasing the number of attributes.  
The Naive Bayesian classifier performs best for 100 attributes, while TiMBL does best 
with the smallest attribute set size (50). TiMBL’s performance was evaluated for three 
different values of k (1,2,10). The method seems to perform best for small k values. For 
k 10= , the performance of the method falls to a very low level, improving only slightly on the 
base case. This is due to the large number of ties for each of the k ( 10= ) distances, which 
leads to a very large neighborhood (> 500 neighbors). In such cases, the behavior of the 
classifier approximates that of the default rule, which classifies everything according to the 
majority class (legitimate in our case). This is also responsible for the insensitivity of the 
method to the number of attributes for k 10= . Outlook’s keyword patterns perform very 
poorly compared to the other two methods, with the exception of TiMBL for k 10= , which 
does even worse. 
6.2. Scenario 2: Notifying senders about blocked messages (λ=9) 
Here we increased the cost of misclassifying legitimate messages, by setting 9=λ . Figure 2 
shows the corresponding results. Comparing to the previous scenario, the most important 
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
5,5
6,0
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700
number of retained attributes
TC
R
Naive Bayesian
TiMBL(1)
TiMBL(2)
TiMBL(10)
Outlook patterns
Figure 2. TCR scores for λ=9 
 9
difference is the lower improvement of the learning methods over the baseline. This is due to 
the increased performance of the baseline as λ increases: without a filter all legitimate 
messages are retained, and this becomes beneficial as λ increases, making it harder to “beat” 
the baseline. The two methods also seem to be less sensitive to the size of the attribute set for 
9=λ . This can be explained by the fact that after a certain number of attributes, the 
classification performance approaches its lowest possible value asymptotically. Another 
interesting observation is that the performance of Outlook’s patterns falls below the base case, 
i.e. one is better off not using the filter. 
6.3. Scenario 3: Removing blocked messages (λ=999) 
In the third scenario a large λ value is used (999). In this case, the choice to use any filter at 
all becomes doubtful, as the performance of the baseline increases to a level that any 
improvement on it is very hard. It is worth noting that this λ value was the one used in 
(Sahami et al., 1998). Figure 3 presents the scenario’s results. 
As expected, now all methods have difficulties achieving better results than the baseline. 
One exception is TiMBL for k 10= , which is consistently higher than the base case by a small 
margin. This is again an effect of the very large neighborhood, which now classifies most 
messages as legitimate, due to the large value of λ. The only instances that are classified as 
spam are those lying in an area of the instance space that is solely occupied by spam training 
instances, i.e. the most certain cases of unseen spam messages. TiMBL for k 2= , manages to 
achieve a significant improvement over the baseline for several consecutive attribute set sizes. 
Although the Naive Bayesian classifier achieves better performance for 300 attributes, this is 
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the only point where it improves over the baseline.  In practical applications, pinpointing the 
optimal attribute set size is infeasible, and hence TiMBL for k 2=  is to be preferred. The 
reason for the abrupt fluctuations in the performance of the methods is that a single 
misclassification of a legitimate message causes a very large fall in TCR. This happens, for 
example, with TiMBL for k 10=  and 550 attributes. 
6.4. Best-performing configurations 
Having investigated the effect of attribute set size, we now concentrate on the attribute set 
sizes for which each learning method performs best, and examine whether the differences 
between the methods are statistically significant. Table 1 presents the results for each method 
and λ value by decreasing TCR. Paired single-tailed t-tests on WAcc show that the 
performance differences between the filter configurations of table 1 are all statistically 
significant at 05.0<p , with the following exceptions (italics in table 1): Naive Bayesian and 
TiMBL (k 2,1= ) for λ 1= ; Naive Bayesian and TiMBL (k 1= ) for λ 9= .  
We note that for a corpus of similar spam rate, (Sahami et al. 1998) reports 92.3% spam 
precision and 80.0% spam recall using the Naive Bayesian classifier at 500 attributes and 
999=λ . No principled comparison to these results can be made, however, as they were 
obtained using a different corpus and additional manually selected phrasal and non-textual 
attributes 
7. Conclusions 
We performed a thorough evaluation of two learning methods on the task of anti-spam 
filtering, using a corpus that we made publicly available, and suitable cost-sensitive 
Filter used 
 λ  
no. of 
attributes 
spam 
recall (%)
spam 
precision 
(%) 
weighted 
accuracy 
(%) 
TCR 
Naive Bayesian 100 82.35 99.02 96.926 5.41 
TiMBL(1) 50 85.27 95.92 96.890 5.35 
TiMBL(2) 50 83.19 97.10 96.753 5.12 
Outlook patterns  − 53.01 87.93 90.978 1.84 
TiMBL(10) 100 34.54 99.64 89.079 1.52 
Baseline (no filter) 
1 
− 0 ∞ 83.374 1 
Naive Bayesian 100 77.57 99.45 99.432 3.82 
TiMBL(1) 200 74.05 98.97 99.274 2.99 
TiMBL(2) 50 63.66 99.05 99.090 2.38 
TiMBL(10) 150 24.55 100.00 98.364 1.33 
Baseline (no filter)  − 0 ∞ 97.832 1 
Outlook patterns  
9 
− 39.29 88.32 97.670 0.93 
Naive Bayesian 300 63.67 100.00 99.993 2.86 
TiMBL(2) 250 54.30 100.00 99.991 2.22 
TiMBL(10) 250 16.45 100.00 99.983 1.18 
Baseline (no filter) − 0 ∞ 99.980 1 
TiMBL(1) 200 74.05 98.97 99.829 0.12 
Outlook patterns  
999 
− 39.29 88.32 98.952 0.02 
Table 1: Results on the Ling-Spam corpus using the best configurations 
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evaluation measures. Both methods achieved very high classification accuracy and clearly 
outperformed the anti-spam keyword patterns of a widely used e-mail reader. Our findings 
suggest that it is entirely feasible to construct learning-based anti-spam filters when spam 
messages are simply to be flagged, or when additional mechanisms are available to inform the 
senders of blocked messages. When no such mechanisms are present, a memory-based 
approach appears to be more viable, but great care is needed to configure the filter 
appropriately.  
We are currently examining alternative learning methods for the same task, including 
attribute-weighted versions of the memory-based algorithm. We also plan to explore 
alternative attribute selection techniques, including term extraction methods to move from 
word to phrasal attributes.  
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